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Abstract
Developing and newly industrialized countries that have experienced the sharpest
increases in wage inequality are those whose export shares have shifted towards more
skill-intensive goods. We argue that this can be explained by technological catch-up.
We develop this insight using a model that features both Ricardian and endowments-
based comparative advantage. In this model Southern catch-up causes production
of the least skill-intensive Northern goods to migrate South (where they become the
most skill-intensive Southern goods). This raises wage inequality in both the South and
the North. We provide empirical evidence that strongly supports this causal mech-
anism: Southern catch-up exacerbates Southern inequality by redirecting Southern
export shares towards more skill-intensive goods. (JEL Classiﬁcation: F1, Keywords:
international trade, inequality, Southern catch-up)
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72016040.The trade-and-wages debate has settled comfortably into what Sherlock Holmes might
have called ‘the 20% solution.’ Using a variety of methodologies, many researchers have
demonstrated that international trade accounts for no more than a ﬁfth of the rising in-
equality experienced by the United States in the last two decades e.g., Feenstra and Hanson
(1996, 1999), Borjas et al. (1997), and Baldwin and Cain (2000). As American academic
interest in the debate wanes, it is easy to forget that the trade-and-wages debate does not
stop at the U.S. border. As demonstrators in Geneva, Seattle, and Qu´ ebec City remind us,
rising inequality is an issue of profound importance to the low- and middle-income countries
that constitute the ‘South.’ This Southern incarnation of the trade-and-wages debate poses
diﬃcult challenges for international trade economists wedded to general equilibrium reason-
ing. Their workhorse general equilibrium model dishes up bland fare for a Southern palate,
namely, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The theorem states that globalization raises the
demand for unskilled Southern labor, thereby reducing inequality in Southern countries.
Unfortunately, this prediction is not borne out by the data.
For example, consider the Freeman and Oostendorp (2001) occupational wage database.
It has 20 developing and newly industrialized countries with consistent data on the relative
wages of production vs. non-production workers over the 1990s. Just over half of these
countries experienced rising inequality over the 1990s. That is to say, globalization has
not reduced wage inequality in Southern countries. Further, this roughly even split between
rising and falling inequality illustrates just how complex the evolution of Southern inequality
has been.
While this complexity calls for an alternative to Stolper-Samuelson reasoning, it oﬀers
no guidance as to what that alternative might be. For example, there is eﬀectively a zero
correlation between changes in inequality and per capita GDP. This leaves us with a frustrat-
ing problem. If the hallmark of international trade theory is general equilibrium reasoning
1and if the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is out of the picture, then what can international
trade theory contribute to our understanding of Southern inequality? Figure 1 is a partial
regression plot that hints at a possible answer. Each point is one of 20 countries from the
Freeman and Oostendorp data in one of four periods (1983-86, 1986-89, 1990-93, 1993-97).
The vertical axis measures the change in wage inequality i.e., the log change in the wage of
non-production workers relative to production workers. The horizontal axis measures the
degree to which export shares have shifted towards more skill-intensive goods. (We will
describe this measure in detail below.) The top panel plots the data in deviations from
country means i.e., it is the partial regression plot from a regression of the growth in wage
inequality on the shift in export shares towards skill-intensive goods and on country ﬁxed
eﬀects. The correlation is 0.51 (p < 0:001). The relationship strengthens when growth in
the relative supply of skills is included in the regression.1 This appears in the bottom panel
of ﬁgure 1, where the correlation is 0.60. We will describe these regressions fully in the
empirical sections of the paper. The main message for now is that general equilibrium trade
linkages across countries likely play at least some role in the complex evolution of Southern
inequality.
To explore this role we develop a model in which the ﬁgure 1 correlation is driven by
Southern productivity catch-up. To this end we marry the Dornbusch et al. (1980) model
of Heckscher-Ohlin trade with the Dornbusch et al. (1977) model of Ricardian trade. The
former allows us to discuss rising wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. The
latter allows us to discuss international technology diﬀerences and Southern productivity
catch-up.
The intellectual inspiration for our modelling is an elegant observation by Feenstra and
1The relative supply of skills is the Barro-Lee (2000) ratio of secondary education completed to secondary
education not completed.
2Hanson (1996) that appeared in a Bhagwati festschrift. Feenstra and Hanson point out that
U.S. capital investments into Mexico pave the way for the United States to outsource its
least skill-intensive goods to Mexico. Since these goods are highly skill intensive by Mexican
standards, outsourcing raises the relative demand for skills in both Mexico and the United
States. This in turn increases the level of inequality in both regions. The model thus
overturns the Stolper-Samuelson prediction and replaces it with a result in which foreign
direct investment raises inequality in both Mexico and the United States.
In the model we will be presenting, there is no foreign direct investment. Instead, we
consider a general form of Southern catch-up that goes beyond physical capital accumulation.
The historical record on growth makes it clear that catching up involves far more than just
physical capital accumulation.2 In our general setting we replicate and extend the Feenstra
and Hanson result. We then show that the faster is a Southern country’s rate of catch-up,
the greater will be the rate at which its export shares shift towards more skill-intensive
goods and the greater will be the rate of growth of wage inequality.
We then turn to an extended empirical assessment of this mechanism using a recursive,
two-equation system implied by the model. The ﬁrst equation explains the growth in wage
inequality in terms of shifts in export shares towards more skill-intensive goods. This is the
equation that underlies ﬁgure 1. The second equation relates export share shifts to Southern
catch-up. The estimates of both equations are consistent with the theory. Further, the
recursive structure of the model is correct. That is, Southern catch-up does not directly
eﬀect inequality: it does so only by shifting a country’s export shares towards more skill-
intensive goods.
In replicating and extending the Feenstra and Hanson result, we use a model that incor-
2Without any pretensions to comprehensiveness, see for example Schultz (1960) on human capital ac-
cumulation, Gerschenkron (1962) on the advantages of being a late-comer, and Acemoglu et al. (2001) on
institutions.
3porates useful features absent from their framework. These include (1) Ricardian sources of
comparative advantage, (2) substitution in production between skilled and unskilled labor,
and (3) skill-biased technical change. Notwithstanding these theoretical innovations, our
core theoretical result is a generalization of the Feenstra-Hanson selection mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 1-3 set up the model and sections 4-5 derive
the core results on catch-up, trade and inequality. Section 6 tightly links the theory to two
estimating equations, section 7 describes the data, and sections 8-9 present the estimates.
Section 10 concludes.
1. The Setup
We follow the Dornbusch et al. (1980) setup as closely as possible. There are 2 regions, North
(N) and South (S). There are 2 factors, unskilled labor (L) and skilled labor (H). There
is a continuum of goods indexed by z with 0 · z · 1. Production functions are regularly
neoclassical, displaying strict quasi-concavity, constant returns to scale, and continuous
derivatives. In addition, there are no factor intensity reversals. This last assumption implies
that we can identify larger z with greater skill intensity. Goods markets are perfectly
competitive and proﬁts are zero in equilibrium. There are no international barriers to trade
in goods. Factor markets are perfectly competitive and clear domestically. Consumers have
identical Cobb-Douglas preferences. Finally, international trade is balanced. This setup is
identical to Dornbusch et al. (1980), except for the presence of international technology
diﬀerences.
There are 2 sources of comparative advantage in our model. The ﬁrst is endowments.
Let wfi be the wage of factor f (= L;H) in region i (= N;S). Let !i ´ wHi=wLi be the
wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor. As in Dornbusch et al. (1980),
4we assume that the North is suﬃciently skill abundant so that !N < !S. This implies
that the North has a comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods. The second source
of comparative advantage ¡ which does not appear in Dornbusch et al. (1980), but is the
focus of Dornbusch et al. (1977) ¡ is Ricardian international technology diﬀerences. We
assume that these diﬀerences confer a comparative advantage to the North in skill-intensive
goods. That is, the North has relatively lower marginal costs for producing relatively more
skill-intensive goods. To express this mathematically, let Ci(wHi;wLi;z) be the unit cost
function for producing good z in region i. We assume that
@CN(¢;¢;z)=CS(¢;¢;z)
@z
· 0 for all z. (1)
With two goods (z1 > z2) inequality (1) can be written as CN(¢;¢;z1)=CN(¢;¢;z2) ·
CS(¢;¢;z1)=CS(¢;¢;z2): That is, it is an inequality involving 2 ratios of marginal costs, just
as in Ricardian textbook explanations of trade. The only diﬀerence is that with 2 types of
labor something must be said about factor prices. Inequality (1) compares CN and CS at
any common set of factor prices.
Lemma 1 establishes that our 2 sources of comparative advantage work in the same
direction and can be neatly integrated into a single model. All proofs appear in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Endowments-based comparative advantage (!N < !S) and Ricardian-based






for all (wHS;wLS;wHN;wLN) such that !N < !S and for all z. That is, the North has a
comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods.
5Given lemma 1 it is easy to show that for each factor price quadruplet satisfying !N <
!S, there is a unique z on the interior of the unit interval such that CN(wHN;wLN;z) =
CS(wHS;wLS;z): (See the proof of lemma 1.) It follows that CN(wHN;wLN;z) is below
CS(wHS;wLS;z) if and only if z > z: This is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. (Note that we do
not know anything about the individual Ci; not even monotonicity. This is because the
individual Ci deal with absolute advantage.)
It follows that even though we have an additional (Ricardian) source of comparative
advantage that does not appear in Dornbusch et al. (1980), under a plausible assumption we
can still expect a similar characterization of equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, there is a ‘competitive
margin’ z such that the North produces all goods z > z and the South produces all goods
z < z: That is, the North specializes in the most skill-intensive goods.
2. Equilibrium Conditions
To keep the notation simple, for the remainder of the paper we suppress the wHi and
wLi as arguments of functions whenever possible. We emphasize that this is a notational
convenience: we are making no assumptions about substitution possibilities in production.
Let Pi(z) be the competitive price for good z produced in region i. z is deﬁned by
PN(z) = PS(z): (3)
By the zero-proﬁt condition, equation (3) is just the ﬁgure 2 crossing condition. Let Yi
be national income in region i. Preferences are given by the Cobb-Douglas utility function
U =
R 1
0 ®(z)lnx(z)dz where for each z; ®(z) is a budget share and x(z) is a quantity





where i = N for z > z and i = S for z < z.
Let Li and Hi be region i’s endowments of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively.
Let Li(z) and Hi(z) be the amount of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, needed to
produce one unit of good z in region i. To keep the reader clear, we repeat that these
are unit demands (not total demands) and that they depend on wHi and wLi (which are
suppressed). Deﬁne hi ´ Hi=Li and hi(z) ´ Hi(z)=Li(z). Market clearing for Southern
skilled labor is given by
Z z
0
x(z)HS(z)dz = HS: (5)
Following Dornbusch et al. (1980), we can combine the zero-proﬁt condition Pi(z) =
wLiLi(z)+wHiHi(z) with equations such as (5) to obtain 2 equations that summarize factor





S(z) is the excess demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor. With some manipu-









dz = 0. (6)
Likewise, the corresponding Northern factor market clearing condition N(z) ´
R 1
z [x(z)HN(z)=
3Preliminary analysis suggests that our results go through with CES preferences. Unfortunately, CES
preferences introduce additional general equilibrium feedbacks that obscure the main point. We have thus
not pursued this line of inquiry in any depth.































dz = 0. (7)
Deﬁne the trade balance as the value of Southern imports divided by the value of North-




0 ®(z)dz): Substituting equation (3) and the zero-



















Following Dornbusch et al. (1980), the search for a competitive equilibrium can be
reduced to the search for a triplet (!N;!S;z) that solves equations (6)-(8). As established
in lemmas 3-4 of Zhu and Treﬂer (2001), there exists a unique equilibrium. Further, if
hN=hS is suﬃciently large then !N < !S will be a feature of the unique equilibrium. Given
our assumption about Ricardian international technology diﬀerences (inequality 1), note
that in order to maintain !N < !S; we require international endowment diﬀerences that
are larger than in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model without technology diﬀerences.
This is because Ricardian international technology diﬀerences lead to higher demand for
the abundant factor in each region and thus technology diﬀerences reduce the gap between
relative wages !N and !S. This completes the setup of the model and the characterization

























from which equation (8) follows.
8of the unique equilibrium.
3. Technical Change and the Deﬁnition of Southern Catch-Up
Given the complexity of the model, including its 2 sources of comparative advantage, we
make several simplifying assumptions about the nature of technical change. For one, we
assume that it involves cost-cutting process innovation rather than product innovation.
This is in the spirit of a model geared to Southern technology catch-up. Product innovation
is taken up in Zhu (2002). Also, we assume that technical change is exogenous and uses
no real resources. Endogenizing technical change oﬀers important insights (Acemoglu 1998,
2002), but is not our focus here.
We are interested in comparative static exercises involving technical change. Let t denote
the state of technology. Note that our model is static so that t is not an index of time. For
each t, there is a unique equilibrium and unique equilibrium outcomes !N(t), !S(t), and
z(t). Re-write factor demands and unit costs in a way that highlights their dependence on
t. Thus the Hi(z;t) and Li(z;t) are factor demands per unit of z and the Ci(wHi;wLi;z;t)
are costs per unit of z. We assume that these functions are diﬀerentiable in t and use the
convention that the Ci(wHi;wLi;z;t) are non-increasing in t; i.e., technical change never
increases unit costs.
The natural measure of productivity growth in the production of good z in region i is
¡@ lnCi(wHi;wLi;z;t)=@t. This is just the dual of the Solow residual. We will write that








9Equation (9) states that the South is catching up if, for good ¯ z = z(t), Southern productivity
rises relative to Northern productivity. We will write that the South is ‘falling behind’ if
°(t) < 0.6
Note that we have deﬁned Southern catch-up only in terms of productivity growth for
good z(t). We could have deﬁned it in terms applicable to all Southern goods; however,
doing so oﬀers no additional insights.7 In what follows we suppress the technology argument
t in !N(t), !S(t), z(t), and °(t). This completes the deﬁnition of Southern catch-up.
4. Neutral Technical Change
In order to make the main results as clear as possible we begin by assuming that Southern
catch-up involves Hicks-neutral technical change. Skill-biased technical change is dealt with
in the next section. Recall that !i is the wage of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor
in region i (= N;S). !N and !S will be our measures of inequality. Theorem 1 relates
Southern catch-up to changing patterns of trade and inequality.
Theorem 1. Assume that technical change is Hicks neutral.
(1) If the South is catching up (° > 0) then d!N=dt > 0, d!S=dt > 0, and dz=dt > 0. That
is, wage inequality widens in both regions and production of the least skill-intensive
Northern goods migrates South.
6It might be helpful to some readers if we were more careful with the notation in equation (9). Through-
out this paper, @Ci(wHi;wLi;z;t)=@t denotes the derivative of Ci(wHi;wLi; ¯ z;t) with respect to its fourth
argument (t) and evaluated at (wHi;wLi; ¯ z) = (wHi(t);wLi(t);z(t)). Re-stated, the derivative holds factor
prices and z(t) constant at their initial equilibrium values.
7Also, it would be nice to express technical change in terms of a more primitive parameterization. This
is done in Zhu and Treﬂer (2001, section 6). There it is shown that there is a 1 : 1 relationship between
primitive parameterizations of Southern catch-up and the more interpretable parameterization of equation
(9).
10(2) If the South is falling behind (° < 0) then d!N=dt < 0, d!S=dt < 0, and dz=dt < 0.
That is, wage inequality falls in both regions and production of the most skill-intensive
Southern goods migrates North.
The way to start thinking about theorem 1 is in terms of the Feenstra and Hanson
(1996) sorting mechanism. Referring to ﬁgure 2, Southern catch-up leads to a fall in the
CS(wHS;wLS;z;t) schedule relative to the CN(wHN;wLN;z;t) schedule. This leads to a
rise in z. In the North, the rise in z eliminates the most unskilled-intensive jobs, thereby
lowering the demand for unskilled labor. Northern inequality rises. In the South, the rise in
z creates jobs that are more skill intensive than any existing Southern jobs, thereby raising
the demand for skilled labor. Southern inequality rises. Of course, this Feenstra-Hanson
mechanism is only part of the story. Neutral technical change has general equilibrium
eﬀects on factor prices that lead to further shifts in the ﬁgure 2 cost curves. To describe
them simply, in the next paragraph we assume that there is no technical change in the
North.
At ﬁxed ¯ z, the proportion of world income spent on Southern goods in the range [0; ¯ z]
is unchanged. That is, there is no increase in the proﬁtability of Southern ﬁrms producing
these goods. Southern catch-up would only induce a fall in the prices of Southern goods
without any change in Southern wages. On the other hand, if Southern wages and the
prices of Southern goods were kept unchanged, there would be a deﬁciency of demand for
Southern labor if the South did not expand the range of goods it produces. This implies
that at unchanged prices and wages the South can undercut the North for some new goods.
Therefore, the equilibrating process involves a rise in ¯ z and changes in relative wages.8
8There is another way of thinking about this. At ﬁxed (!N;!S), Southern catch-up makes the South
absolutely more productive. This leads to positive proﬁts in the South. Competition for labor among
Southern ﬁrms raises the relative wage of Southern workers (wLS=wLN and wHS=wHN rise). Rising income
leads the South to import more. The result is a negative Southern trade balance. To eliminate the trade
11The basic insight of theorem 1 is simple. Technical change is factor augmenting. Thus,
Southern technical catch-up increases the South’s eﬀective size and with it, the world’s
relative supply of unskilled labor. In a world of integrated markets, this increase depresses
the relative wage of unskilled workers everywhere.
It must be emphasized that Southern catch-up can only go so far before the South
leapfrogs the North or, less dramatically, before our assumptions about endowments-based
comparative advantage (!N < !S) and Ricardian-based comparative advantage (inequality
1) are violated. When Southern catch-up advances this far, theorem 1 is no longer relevant.
This completes the discussion of theorem 1.
Southern catch-up raises ¯ z, leading to rising wage inequality in both the North and the
South. The next theorem explores how d!N=dt; d!S=dt; and dz=dt depend on the rate of
Southern catch-up °.
Theorem 2. d!N=dt, d!S=dt, and dz=dt are increasing in the rate of Southern catch-up
(°). In particular, the faster is Southern catch-up, the greater is the growth in Southern
inequality and Southern exports.
This theorem is helpful for empirical work because it suggests a speciﬁcation in rates of
growth or changes. In particular, there is a positive correlation between d!S=dt and d¯ z=dt.
imbalance the South increases its supply of goods and reduces its demand for Northern goods. Both changes
are facilitated by a rise in z.
Now allow (!N;!S) to change. The rise in z eliminates the trade imbalance, but creates Southern excess
demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor. Rising !S eliminates this excess demand in 2 ways.
First, it leads to a within-good substitution away from skilled labor. Second, it increases the relative price
of skill-intensive goods which leads to a between-good reallocation toward the South’s unskilled-intensive
goods. Together, these 2 mechanisms clear Southern labor markets. Adjustment in the North proceeds
along similar lines.
Finally, it is easy to prove that the rise in !S increases the relative price of skill-intensive goods. Let
µHS(z) ´ wHSHS(z)=[wHSHS(z) + wLSLS(z)] be the cost share of skilled workers in the production of
good z in the South. Consider two Southern goods z1 and z2: Diﬀerentiating the relative price of the two
goods with respect to the relative wage yields d[PS(z2)=PS(z1)]=d!S = µHS(z2)¡µHS(z1) which is positive
if and only if z2 > z1:
12To summarize, theorems 1-2 establish that rising inequality in both the North and the
South are consistent with an almost-standard trade model featuring a combination of Ri-
cardian and Heckscher-Ohlin elements. Theorem 1 also shows that skill-biased technical
change is not necessary for rising inequality. Even with neutral technical change, Southern
catch-up can raise wage inequality in both regions.
5. Skill-Biased Technical Change
Of course, skill-biased technical change is likely the single most important contributor to
rising inequality in the North (e.g., Katz and Murphy 1992, Autor et al. 1998, and Berman
et al. 1998). We also know from Berman and Machin (2000) that the South has experienced
skill upgrading so that skill-biased technical change in the South is likely also relevant.
We therefore need to ensure that our trade-based explanation of North-South inequality










be the rate of skill-biased technical change in region i = N;S. We begin with a simplifying
assumption.
Assumption 1. The rate of skill-biased technical change in region i is the same for all
goods produced in region i. That is, ½i(z;t) = ½i(t) for all z, i = N;S.
Assumption 1 is made for expositional ease in characterizing skill-biased technical change
and is otherwise entirely unnecessary.9 In what follows, the dependence of the ½i on t is
9Without assumption 1, ½N(t) is replaced throughout by b2 of appendix equation (19) and ½S(t) is
replaced throughout by b3 of appendix equation (20). b2 and b3 are weighted averages across z of the rates
of skill-biased technical change. The generality obtained by eliminating assumption 1 is more than oﬀset
by the notational burden of equations (19) and (20).
13dropped.
Under assumption 1, d!N=dt, d!S=dt, and dz=dt are linear functions of °; ½N; and ½S.
Speciﬁcally, letting x index !N; !S; and z;
dx
dt
= cx° + ax½N + bx½S; x = !N;!S;z (10)
where ax, bx, and cx are functions of preferences and the level of technology, but are not
functions of the technology change parameters (°;½N;½S). The proof of linearity is not
complicated. (See appendix A.3.)
Theorem 3. Let assumption 1 hold. Then (1) c!N > 0, c!S > 0; cz > 0, (2) a!N > 0;
b!S > 0, (3) a!S < 0, az < 0, and (4) b!N < 0, bz < 0.
Part 1 is a restatement of theorem 2 and mirrors the Feenstra-Hanson selection mecha-
nism. Part 2 makes the obvious point that skill-biased technical change in a region raises
inequality in that region. Parts 3-4 describe a novel cross-country spillover eﬀect associated
with skill-biased technical change. Consider part 3. Skill-biased technical change in the
North depresses the relative wage of Northern unskilled workers. This makes it more diﬃ-
cult for the South to displace Northern production of the North’s least skilled goods (az < 0).
This in turn retards the eﬀect of Southern catch-up on Southern inequality (a!S < 0). Part
4 works exactly the same way as part 3, but starts with Southern skill-biased technical
change. A more detailed discussion appears in section 5 of Zhu and Treﬂer (2001). This
completes the characterization of the relationship between Southern catch-up, international
trade, and inequality.
146. Linking Theory to Empirics
The core insight of our model is that Southern catch-up ° raises Southern wage inequality !S
by raising z. To examine this empirically we need to link the theory as tightly as possible to
an estimating equation. In the theoretical discussion above we allowed for technical change,
but held all of the remaining exogenous variables (i.e., endowments) constant. We will
need to allow for endowment changes as speciﬁed by the theory. Further, we anticipate the
empirical results by focussing on Hicks-neutral Southern catch-up.
The direct relationship between z and !S is fully characterized by the Southern labor-
market clearing condition (equation 6). Totally diﬀerentiating equation (6) with respect
to z, !S and all of the exogenous variables that appear in the equation yields the linear
relationship
dln!S = ¯zd¯ z + µ1dln(HS=LS): (11)
We expect ¯z > 0 since this is the core Feenstra-Hanson selection mechanism. Further, we
expect µ1 < 0 since the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of an increase in the supply of skills is a fall in
wage inequality. More formally, it is straightforward to sign ¯z and µ1 using the information
supplied in appendix A.3.10 It is also important to notice what is excluded from equation
(11), namely, Northern endowment changes dHN and dLN and Southern catch-up °dt.
Of course, dz depends on Southern catch-up. Equation (10) above showed that the
general equilibrium change in z due to Southern catch-up is dz = cz°dt where, from the-
orem 3, cz > 0. The change in z due to changes in the remaining exogenous variables
(HS;LS;HN;LN) is obtained in the same way that dz = cz°dt was obtained. That is, it is
10In the notation of appendix A.3, ¯z ´ ¡!Sc21=c22 and µ1 ´ !S
R ¯ z
0 ®(z)dz=c22. From appendix equation
(18), c21 > 0 and c22 < 0 so that ¯z > 0 and µ1 < 0.
15obtained by totally diﬀerentiating equations (6)-(8). This yields the linear relationship
dz = ¯°°dt + µ2dln(HS=LS) + µ3dln(LS=LN) + µ4dln(HN=LN): (12)
The four endowments collapse into three ratios because there are no scale eﬀects in the
model. Our focus is on the eﬀects of Southern catch-up on z i.e., on ¯° ´ cz > 0. It is
straightforward to sign the remaining coeﬃcients using the information supplied in appendix
A.3. In particular, µ2 > 0, µ3 > 0, and µ4 7 0.11
Our econometric strategy is to estimate equation (11) using equation (12) as a ﬁrst-stage
regression or instrument set for dz. The fact that °; LS=LN and HN=LN do not appear in
equation (11) provides the exclusion restrictions underlying this estimation strategy.
7. The Data
7.1. The Trade Cut-Oﬀ (z)
We use trade data at the 4-digit SITC level from the World Trade Database (Feenstra et
al. 1997 and Feenstra 2000). Unfortunately, aggregation bias prevents us from directly
observing z. The problem is that at the 4-digit SITC level of the World Trade Database,
most countries export most goods. In many cases there is thus no cutoﬀ z beyond which
Southern countries cease exporting. As Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Schott (2003) have
argued, this lack of specialization is likely an artifact of aggregation bias.12 Fortunately, our
11In the notation of appendix A.3, µ2 ´ [c22c33YHS ¡ c12c33
R ¯ z
0 ®(z)dz]=jcjkj; µ3 ´ c22c33=jcjkj, and
µ4 ´ [¡c22c33YHN ¡ c22c13
R 1
¯ z ®(z)dz]=jcjkj. The signs of the cjk and the determinant jcjkj are given in
appendix equations (17)-(18) and imply µ2 > 0, µ3 > 0, and µ4 7 0.
12The Feenstra and Hanson argument is about the fact that within each 4-digit SIC industry (e.g., autos)
there are both low-z intermediates (e.g., car seats) and high-z intermediates (e.g., engine blocks). Our model
can be easily modiﬁed to allow for such intermediate inputs. This is shown in detail in Zhu and Treﬂer
(2001, section 9).
16inability to observe z is not an insurmountable obstacle to empirical work. In our model, an
increase in z shifts the South’s export shares towards the South’s most skill intensive goods.
Such export share shifts are observable. We will therefore examine predictions involving
observable export share shifts (as opposed to unobservable shifts in z).
To measure export share shifts, we rank each industry based on its ratio of non-production
workers to production workers. A high ratio corresponds to a high z. Given our assumption
of no factor intensity reversals, we can rank industries based on U.S. data on the employ-
ment of production and non-production workers. Data by 4-digit SIC are from the NBER
productivity dataset. We use data from 1990, the mid-year of our sample. In order to match
these data with the trade data, we aggregate the trade data to the 4-digit SIC level using
the converter supplied by Feenstra (1997).13
We focus on Southern exports to Northern countries. Northern countries are the major
OECD countries whose 1980 real GDP per capita exceeds $14,000 (1980 dollars). These
countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. For our results it does not matter exactly which countries are included in
the North provided that the major destinations for Southern exports are included i.e., the
United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.
Southern countries are countries whose 1980 real GDP per capita is below $14,000. The
richest of these is Hong Kong with a GDP per capita of $12,578. We have also considered
Southern cut-oﬀs of $10,000 and $7,500. All our results hold with these lower cut-oﬀs.
Let i index Southern countries and let t index years. While dt has been used as an index
13The converter derived from Feenstra (1997) maps the U.N. standard 4-digit SITC codes into 4 digit
US SIC (1972 basis). Since the World Trade Flow Database is classiﬁed by Statistics Canada’s SITC codes
instead, we carefully deal with the roll-up problems which are detailed in Feenstra et al. (1997) and Feenstra
(2000).
17of the change in technology, for the remainder of the paper the subscript t will be used as
an index of time. This should cause no confusion. Let Xit(z) be the share of country i’s
exports that are accounted for by industry z i.e., exports of z divided by total exports. Then
R z
0 Xit(e z)de z is the share of country i’s exports accounted for by industries in the range (0;z).
The left panel of ﬁgure 3 plots Sri Lanka’s
R z
0 Xit(e z)de z for 1990 (the black curve) and 1993
(the grey curve). Between 1990 and 1993, the curves shifted to the left which means that
the export shares of unskilled-intensive industries grew. The right panel of ﬁgure 3 plots
the
R z
0 Xit(e z)de z for Thailand. Here the curves shifted to the right which indicates that Thai
exports became more skill intensive over the period.14
Figure 3 suggests a useful measure of the shift in export shares towards more skill-







[Xi;t¡1(e z) ¡ Xit(e z)]de zdz: (13)
In the case of Thailand, ∆Zit is positive because the 1990 curve lies above the 1993 curve.
For Sri Lanka, ∆Zit is negative because the 1990 curve lies below the 1993 curve. More
generally, ∆Zit is positive (negative) when export shares have shifted towards more (less)
skill-intensive goods.15
A few words on the relationship between dz and ∆Zit are in order. An increase in dz
(i) increases the export shares of skill-intensive industries, thereby increasing ∆Zit, and
14Notice that the Sri Lankan
R z
0 Xit(e z)de z are concave which means that Sri Lankan exports are dominated
by unskilled-intensive industries. In contrast, the U.S.
R z
0 Xit(e z)de z are strongly convex which means that
U.S. exports are dominated by skill-intensive industries. Between these two extremes is the more linear
Thai
R z
0 Xit(e z)de z. Thus, the shape of the
R z
0 Xit(e z)de z reﬂects a ‘ladder of development.’
15For most of our data, the two curves do not cross i.e., technical change is a ﬁrst order stochastic dominant
shift of
R z
0 Xit (e z)de z. Occasionally the curves cross. In this case, a positive ∆Zit implies that on average
export shares have shifted towards more skill-intensive goods.
18(ii) increases the level of exports. This means that the use of ∆Zit, by missing level-of-
export eﬀects, biases the empirical work against ﬁnding trade impacts. It is a conservative
measure. Also, the fact that ∆Zit and dz are not equivalent means that we are not testing our
model. In particular, we are not examining the model’s prediction of complete specialization
characterized by a cut-oﬀ z. Rather, our interest is centered on the model’s implications
for Southern inequality i.e., equation (11). We are using the theory to frame an analysis
of how Southern catch-up increases the export shares of the South’s most skill-intensive
goods, thereby raising the relative demand for Southern skilled labor. This is a weaker set
of predictions than those involving z.
7.2. Measuring Southern Inequality (!S)
Let wHit and wLit be the wages of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, in country i.
Our object of study is log changes in Southern relative wages, ∆lnwHit=wLit. Wage data
are from the Freeman and Oostendorp (2001) NBER database on wages by occupation and
industry for 1983-97. The authors have cleaned up the original ILO data, which is notorious
for its many missing values. We select only those developing and middle-income countries for
which there are substantial data over the 1983-89 period and/or the 1990-97 period. Since
annual changes are too noisy for our purposes, we consider changes in inequality either over
the two periods 1983-89 and 1990-97 or the four periods 1983-86, 1986-89, 1990-93, and
1993-97.16 We require that each country have data for at least two periods so that we can
use country ﬁxed eﬀects. This leaves us with 20 countries and 58 observations in the four-
period case and 17 countries and 34 observations in the two-period case. Clearly, we will
need parsimonious speciﬁcations. Appendix table A.1 lists the countries and year intervals
16The exact periods vary somewhat across countries depending on data availability. See appendix table
A.1. Throughout the paper, all log changes are annualized. That is, they are divided by the number of
years involved in order to ensure comparability across changes of diﬀerent lengths.
19in our data set.
To be consistent with our deﬁnition of ∆Zit, we deﬁne wHit as the average wage of
manufacturing workers in non-production occupations (managers, professionals, technicians,
and clerks) and wLit as the average wage of manufacturing workers in production occupations
(craft workers, operators, and laborers). See appendix A.4 for details.
7.3. Measuring Southern Catch-Up (°dt) and Endowments
We measure Southern catch-up °dt as the log change of labor productivity in manufacturing.
Denote this by °m
it where the m superscript refers to ‘measured.’17 The labor productivity
data (value added per worker in manufacturing) used to construct °m
it are from Antweiler
and Treﬂer (2002). We updated these data using the 1999 UNIDO industrial statistics
database.
Let Hit and Lit be the endowments of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, in
Southern country i. Let HNt and LNt be the endowments of skilled and unskilled workers,
respectively, in the North. Following Barro and Lee (2000), skilled workers are those who
completed at least a secondary education and unskilled workers are all others. Notice that
this classiﬁcation diﬀers from the production/non-production classiﬁcation used elsewhere
in the empirical work.
17° is deﬁned in equation (9). Noting that ¡@CS=@t and ¡@CN=@t of equation (9) are, by duality,






where n indexes the Northern trading partners of Southern country i and Áint is a weight reﬂecting the size
of bilateral trade ﬂows between countries i and n. As an empirical matter, the term Σn²NÁint°m
nt does not
vary much over time so that with country ﬁxed eﬀects the variation in e °
m
it is mainly driven by variation in
°m
it . Thus, ﬁxed eﬀect results based on e °
m
it and °m
it are all but identical and we only report results using °m
it .
208. Estimation























where ®i and ®0
i are country ﬁxed eﬀects that capture unobserved country heterogeneity.
Given the small sample size we will mostly report results for changes over the four periods
1983-86, 1986-89, 1990-93, and 1993-97. Very similar results, albeit with larger standard
errors, obtain when changes over the two periods 1983-89 and 1990-97 are used.
A diﬃculty in relating empirical equations (14)-(15) to theoretical equations (11)-(12) is
that the theory has only one Southern country while the empirical work has many Southern
countries. Extending the model to allow for many countries is complicated, a point Wilson
(1980) showed for the simpler Ricardian model. The problem is that South-South trade in
the model complicates our prediction about North-South trade. Since South-South trade
is relatively small and not the focus of our work, we ignore South-South complications and
move straight to multi-country empirical work.
8.1. The Wage Inequality Equation: OLS
In estimating equation (14), we are primarily interested in whether ¯∆Z is positive as pre-
dicted by the theory. The top panel of table 1 displays estimates of equation (14). The de-
pendent variable is the growth in the relative wage of non-production workers (∆lnwHit=wLit).
From column 1, the estimated coeﬃcient on ∆Zit is positive as predicted (b ¯∆z = 0:73). Fur-
21ther, the t-statistic is 4.48 which is remarkably high given that there are only 58 observations
and 20 country ﬁxed eﬀects i.e., there are only 36 degrees of freedom. The partial regression
plot for the column 1 speciﬁcation appeared above in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 and shows
no evidence of outliers or other features of the data that might create misleading inferences.
Most theories, including ours, predict that a rise in the relative supply of skills lowers
the relative wage of skilled workers. In fact, we ﬁnd the opposite (b µ1 = 0:34 in column
1 of table 1). An endogeneity problem is almost certainly behind this positive coeﬃcient.
Whatever is causing ﬁrms to catch-up in the production of more skill-intensive goods is also
causing workers to acquire more skills. Fortunately, our estimates of ¯∆Z are not sensitive
to how ∆lnHit=Lit is modelled. In the extreme case where ∆lnHit=Lit is omitted from the
regression, b ¯∆Z = 0:70 (t = 3:64) which is very similar to the 0:73 estimate in column 1
of table 1. The partial regression plot for the case where ∆lnHit=Lit is omitted from the
regression appeared above as the top panel of ﬁgure 1.
We have considered a large number of alternative speciﬁcations. We brieﬂy summarize
these here. First, when period dummies are introduced they are jointly insigniﬁcant even at
the 10% level and b ¯∆Z = 0:67 (t = 3:51) is not much changed. Second, instead of dividing
the sample into four periods, we divided it into 2 periods, 1983-89 and 1990-97. This leaves
the estimated ¯∆Z virtually unchanged (b ¯∆Z = 0:70, t = 2:40) despite halving the sample
size. Third, lowering the Southern GDP per capita cut-oﬀ does not alter our conclusions.
For example, using a $10,000 cut-oﬀ, the estimate of ¯∆Z is 0:72 (t = 4:10), which is virtually
identical to its table 1 baseline estimate of 0:73.
8.2. The Export Shares Equation: OLS
In estimating equation (15), we are primarily interested in whether ¯° is positive as predicted
by the theory. That is, does Southern catch-up shift export shares towards more skill-
22intensive goods? Columns 5-7 in the bottom panel of table 1 report the estimates of equation
(15). To help us get closer to causality, we introduce °m
it with a lag. In columns 5-7, the lags
are 1-, 3-, and 10-years, respectively.18 The b ¯° are all positive as predicted and largest for
the 10-year lag (b ¯° = 0:17, t = 3:02). Again, we ﬁnd the t-statistic of 3:02 to be remarkable
given the limited degrees of freedom. That it takes up to a decade before the full eﬀects
of Southern labor productivity growth on exporting are worked through corresponds to the
Bernard and Jensen (1999) observation that productivity growth precedes exporting.
The remaining equation (15) endowment coeﬃcients are of less interest, so we review
them only brieﬂy. From columns 5-8 in the bottom panel of table 1, the endowment coeﬃ-
cients almost always have the theoretically predicted signs. The coeﬃcients on ∆Lit=LNt and
∆lnHit=Lit are positive as expected. The theory does not predict the sign on ∆lnHNt=LNt.
We estimate it to be positive. Given that ∆lnHNt=LNt only varies across time, not coun-
tries, it is not surprising that its coeﬃcient is never statistically signiﬁcant.
8.3. The Wage Inequality Equation: IV
Next we return to the wage inequality equation (equation 14) in order to address the en-
dogeneity of ∆Zit. ∆Zit is instrumented using the ﬁrst-stage equation (15) speciﬁcation
that we just described. We begin by checking that the instruments °m
it , ∆lnLit=LNt, and
∆lnHNt=LNt do not belong directly in the second stage. The theory predicts exactly this
exclusion restriction. Columns 2-4 in the top panel of table 1 include these instruments
directly into the second-stage equation and show that the exclusion restrictions are satis-
ﬁed. Speciﬁcally, the last line in the top panel of table 1 shows that the three instruments
are jointly insigniﬁcant. The F-statistics in columns 2-4 are tiny compared even to the 5%
18For example, if ∆Zit is a change over the 1990-93 period then °m
i;t¡3 is a change over the 1987-90 period.
23critical level of 2.89.
The IV results appear in columns 5-8 of the top panel of table 1. Since any omitted
variable that raises Southern inequality likely reduces the export shares of skill-intensive
goods, the OLS estimate is likely biased downward. As expected, the OLS estimate b ¯∆Z =
0:73 is smaller than each of the IV estimates. However, the OLS and IV estimates are not
that far apart so that the Hausman test rejects endogeneity. This is reported in the second
last line of the table. The last line reports overidentiﬁcation tests. The tiny Â2-statistics
further validate our instruments.
Column 8 restricts the number of instruments to the point where the model is just
identiﬁed. Note that ∆lnHNt=LNt and ∆lnLit=LNt in the bottom panel of table 1 are not
jointly signiﬁcant. For example, the F-test of their joint signiﬁcance in column 7 is only 1:67
which is well below even the 5% critical value of 3.28. Thus, in column 8 we omit these two
instruments. (We keep ∆lnHit=Lit in the column 8 speciﬁcation because it appears in the
second stage and so must be included in the ﬁrst-stage.) As a result, the t-statistic for °m
i;t¡10
increases slightly to 3:42. This strengthens a core prediction of the model. Nevertheless,
endogeneity continues to be rejected.
To summarize, table 1 shows three things. First, Southern catch-up shifts the South’s
export shares towards more skill-intensive goods (b ¯° = 0:18 , t = 3:42). Second, the
resulting shift in export shares increases the level of wage inequality (b ¯∆Z = 0:73, t = 4:48).
Taken together, these conclusions mean that Southern catch-up has contributed to rising
wage inequality in the South. Third, the model’s exclusion restrictions are accepted by the
data i.e., Southern catch-up raises wage inequality only indirectly by shifting export shares
∆Zit. Thus, the implications of the model, with ∆Zit replacing dz, are supported by the
data.
249. Alternative Trade Mechanisms
Table 2 examines whether ∆Zit may be capturing trade eﬀects per se that have little to
do with the causal mechanisms outlined in the model. Column 1 of table 2 reports our
baseline speciﬁcation carried over from column 1 of table 1. In column 2 of table 2, ∆Zit is
replaced by the log change in exports of manufactured goods. Thus, we are abstracting from
changes in the composition of export shares and focusing on changes in the level of total
exports. The estimated coeﬃcient on export growth is 0.04 with a t-statistic of 1.50. That
is, the relationship between export growth per se and wage inequality is not signiﬁcant. In
column 3 we reintroduce ∆Zit into the regression. Its coeﬃcient and t-statistic are very
similar to those of our baseline speciﬁcation. In contrast, the coeﬃcient on export growth
literally drops to zero. Note that what matters for inequality is the technological change
that induces a change in export shares to more skill-intensive goods. These results make
it clear that the change in export shares is better correlated with this technological change
than is general growth in Southern manufacturing exports.
Zhu (2002) has explored the role of product cycles for understanding skill upgrading at
the industry level. Her analysis suggests that it might be useful to distinguish goods that
the South has long exported (‘previously exported goods’) from goods that the South began
exporting in the sample period (‘newly exported goods’). Increases in z are associated
with newly exported goods. Identifying newly exported goods in our setting is not easy
because of aggregation problems. At the level of our 4-digit SITC trade data, most countries
appear to export most goods so that there are very few newly exported goods. With
this caveat in mind, we proceed to decompose total exports into previously exported and
newly exported goods. Here, newly exported goods are identiﬁed as goods that were not
exported at the beginning of the 80s (or 90s) but started to be exported later in the 80s (or
2590s). Correspondingly, previously exported goods are deﬁned as goods that were exported
throughout the 80s (or 90s). Columns 4-5 of table 2 report the results for newly and
previously exported goods, respectively. In both columns, the coeﬃcient on ∆Zit is positive;
however, the newly exported goods coeﬃcient is statistically much more signiﬁcant (t = 4:07
versus t = 2:94). Further, the newly exported goods speciﬁcation has a much higher R
2
(0.61
versus 0.54). This takes us one step closer to relating our export share ﬁnding (¯∆Z > 0) to
changes in z.19
10. Conclusion
Among developing and newly industrialized countries, the Freeman and Oostendorp (2001)
database shows that rising wage inequality during the 1983-97 period was a common oc-
currence. This is sharply at odds with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which predicts that
Southern inequality should have fallen. In trying to explain this complex evolution of South-
ern inequality, we pointed out that there is a positive correlation across Southern countries
between the growth in wage inequality and the shifting of export shares towards the South’s
most skill-intensive goods. This suggested to us that trends in wage inequality across devel-
oping and newly industrialized countries are linked via general equilibrium trade movements
triggered by technological catch-up.
19It is perhaps worth pointing out the diﬀerences between our paper and Zhu (2002). First, Zhu (2002)
is concerned with industry-level skill upgrading in a product-cycle model. Her dependent variable is thus
the payroll share of non-production workers. In contrast, we are concerned with wage inequality in a model
of Southern catch-up. Since labor markets clear at the national level, our analysis is appropriately at the
country level, not the industry level. Second, Zhu (2002) uses only U.S. trade data. Because her data are at
the 5-digit SITC level, the additional detail allows her to carefully distinguish between newly and previously
exported goods. In contrast, our focus on Southern countries means that we must use the World Trade
Database which only has data at the 4-digit SITC level. Third, Zhu (2002) exploits wage and employment
data from the United Nations General Industrial Statistics over the period 1978-92. In contrast, we use the
Freeman and Oostendorp ILO-based dataset for the period 1983-97. This dataset contains better data on
wage inequality, but does not contain the employment data Zhu (2002) needs to examine skill upgrading.
26To model this, we married the Ricardian international technology diﬀerences model
(Dornbusch et al. 1977) with the Heckscher-Ohlin model (Dornbusch et al. 1980). In our
model, technological catch-up causes production of the least skill-intensive Northern goods
to migrate South where they become the most skill-intensive Southern goods. Thus, the
demand for skills and hence wage inequality rise in both regions. This mechanism is closely
related to that described by Feenstra and Hanson (1996).
We found empirical support for three predictions associated with this mechanism. First,
Southern catch-up shifts export shares towards the South’s most skill-intensive goods (b ¯° >
0). Second, the resulting shift in export shares increases the level of wage inequality (b ¯∆Z >
0). Third, Southern catch-up does not directly raise wage inequality. Rather, Southern
catch-up raises wage inequality only indirectly by raising the export shares of the South’s
most skill-intensive goods.
27A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Let LN(z) and HN(z) be the amount of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, needed
to produce one unit of good z in the North. Deﬁne hN(z) ´ HN(z)=LN(z). To keep
the notation clear, the relative wage !N has been suppressed. Since CN(wHN;wLN;z) is
homogenous of degree one in wHN and wLN; CN(wHN;wLN;z) = wLN ¢ CN(!N;1;z): Dif-
ferentiating this with respect to wLN yields @CN(wHN;wLN;z)=@wLN = CN(!N;1;z) ¡
!N@CN(!N;1;z)=@!N: By Shepard’s Lemma, we have LN(z) = @CN(wHN;wLN;z)=@wLN:












































[1 + !NhN(z)]2 > 0.
Hence, if !N < !S; then @ lnCN(wHN;wLN;z)=@z < @ lnCN(wHS;wLS;z)=@z: From in-
equality (1) we have @ lnCN(wHS;wLS;z)=@z · @ lnCS(wHS;wLS;z)=@z: Combining these
two inequality yields @ lnCN(wHN;wLN;z)=@z < @ lnCS(wHS;wLS;z)=@z: This implies that
inequality (2) holds.
This completes the proof of lemma 1. Note that given factor prices, ¯ z must be unique
because CN(wHN;wLN;z) and CS(wHS;wLS;z) intersect only once.
A.2. Downward Sloping Aggregate Relative Demands
Lemma 2. Given z; @N(z)=@!N < 0 and @S(z)=@!S < 0: That is, the aggregate demand
for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor is downward sloping.
Proof. We only consider the Southern labor market. Let "S(z) ´ ¡@ lnhS(z;t)=@!S > 0
be the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers for Southern good
z. Let µHS(z) and µLS(z) be the cost shares of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively.








®(z)µHS(z)fµLS(z)["S(z) ¡ 1] + YLSgdz:
By inspection, if @S(¯ z)=@!S < 0for "S(¢) = 0; then @S(¯ z)=@!S < 0 for all "S(¢) ¸ 0: We








®(z)[µLS(z) ¡ YLS]µHS(z)dz: (16)
28Since
R ¯ z
0 ®(z)[µLS(z)¡YLS]dz = 0;20 and µLS(z)¡YLS decreases in z; there exists a z0 2 (0;z)
such that (i) when z = z0; µLS(z) ¡ YLS = 0; (ii) when z < z0; µLS(z) ¡ YLS > 0; (iii) when
z > z0; µLS(z) ¡ YLS < 0: Further, since µHS(z) increases in z; we have (i) when z · z0;




















®(z)[µLS(z) ¡ YLS]dz = 0
as required.
A.3. Proofs of the Core Theorems 1-3
The following proofs are based on diﬀerential equation system (17), which is derived by























Note that subscripts on B, S, and N denote partial derivations e.g., B¯ z ´ @B=@¯ z.
The elements of [cjk] and [bj] are as followings. Note that all variables except ®(¢) depend
on the technology state t: To simplify notion, tis suppressed unless it is necessary:
20Plugging equation (4) into equation (5) and using the zero-proﬁt condition yield







Multiplying the result by wHS implies wHSHS=(YN + YS) =
R ¯ z
0 ®(z)µHS(z)dz: The balance-of-trade condi-



































!S[µHS(z) ¡ YHS] > 0 c13 = 1




c22 = ¡ 1
!SYHS
R z
0 ®(z)µHS(z)[µLS(z)("S(z) ¡ 1) + YLS]dz < 0 c23 = 0
c31 = ®(z)
YHN¡µHN(z)
YHN > 0 c32 = 0
c33 = ¡ 1
!NYHN
R 1
z ®(z)µHN(z)[µLN(z)("N(z) ¡ 1) + YLN]dz < 0
9
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > =























where µLi(z) ´ wLiLi(z;t)=[wLiLi(z;t)+wHiHi(z;t)]; µHi(z) = 1¡µLi(z); YLi ´ wLiLi=(wLiLi+
wHiHi); YHi = 1 ¡ YLi, "i(z) ´ ¡@ lnhi(z;t)=@ ln!i:
c11 is positive because the North has a comparative advantage in more skill-intensive
goods (lemma 1.) By lemma 2, c22 ´ @S(¯ z)=@!S and c33 ´ @N(¯ z)=@!N are negative. The
signs of other elements in [cjk] follow from the convention that a higher z good uses relatively
more skilled labor. Finally, the signs of the cjk imply that the determinant jcjkj is strictly
positive.
Using the fact that jcjkj > 0; one can invert equation (17) to yield equation (10) with
dz
dt








= [¡c31c22° + c12c31b2 + (c11c22 ¡ c21c12)b3]jcjkj
¡1: (23)
Proof of theorem 1
With neutral technical change, b2 = b3 = 0: Equations (21)-(23) thus imply that dz=dt;
d!N=dt and d!S=dt have the same signs as °: The theorem follows immediately.
Proof of theorem 2
The theorem follows from the fact that the three coeﬃcients on ° in equations (21)-(23)
are positive.










0: Under assumption 1, b2 = ¡½Sb
0
2; and b3 = ¡½Nb
0
3: Substituting these expressions for b2
and b3 into equations (21)-(23) yields equation (10) with
30(1) c¯ z = c22c33=jcjkj > 0, a¯ z = c22c13b
0
3=jcjkj < 0, and b¯ z = c12c33b
0
2=jcjkj < 0;
(2) c!S = ¡c21c33=jcjkj > 0, a!S = ¡c21c13b
0




(3) c!N = ¡c22c31=jcjkj > 0, a!N = ¡(c11c22¡c12c21)b
0





Our choice of countries is mainly dictated by the availability of data from the Freeman-
Oostendorp database. The countries selected for our sample are those satisfying the following
criteria: (a) The country had real GDP per capita below $14,000 in 1980. Transitional
economies are excluded. (b) The country had observations on a ﬁxed set of manufacturing
occupations for at least two periods. Although the Freeman-Oostendorp dataset has 55
industry-occupation pairs in the manufacturing sector, most countries only reported data
for a relatively small set of occupations. (c) The country had consistent data for both non-
production occupations (managers, professionals, technicians, and clerks) and production
occupations (craft workers, operators, and laborers). (d) The country had data on labor
productivity, bilateral trade ﬂows, and human capital. These criteria leave us with 20
countries in the sample. The list of countries and key variables are given in table A.1.
31References
Acemoglu, Daron (1998) “Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Tech-
nical Change and Wage Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (4), 1055–
1089.
(2002) “Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 40 (1), 7–72.
, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001) “The Colonial Origins of Com-
parative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91
(5), 1369–1401.
Antweiler, Werner and Daniel Treﬂer (2002) “Increasing Returns and All That: A
View From Trade,” American Economic Review, 92 (1), 93–119.
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Alan B. Krueger (1998) “Computing
Inequality: Have Computers Changed the Labor Market,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 113 (4), 1169–1213.
Baldwin, Robert E. and Glen G. Cain (2000) “Shifts in Relative U.S. Wages: The Role
of Trade, Technology, and Factor Endowments,” Review of Economics and Statistics,
82 (4), 580–95.
Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000) “International Data on Educational At-
tainment: Updates and Implications.” CID Working Paper #42.
Berman, Eli and Stephen Machin (2000) “Skill-Biased Technology Transfer: Evidence
of Factor Biased Technological Change in Developing Countries.” Mimeo, Boston Uni-
versity.
, John Bound, and Stephen Machin (1998) “Implications of Skill-Biased Tech-
nological Change: International Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (4),
1245–1279.
Bernard, Andrew and Bradford Jensen (1999) “Exceptional Exporter Performance:
Cause, Eﬀect, or Both?,” Journal of International Economics, 47 (1), 1–25.
Borjas, George J., Richard B. Freeman, and Lawrence F. Katz (1997) “How Much
Do Immigration and Trade Aﬀect Labor Market Outcomes?,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, (1), 1–67.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Stanley Fischer, and Paul A. Samuelson (1977) “Comparative
Advantage, Trade, and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods,”
American Economic Review, 67 (5), 823–39.
, , and (1980) “Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory with a Continuum of Goods,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95 (2), 203–224.
32Feenstra, Robert C. (1997) “U.S. Exports, 1972-94: With State Exports and Other U.S.
Data.” NBER Working Paper #5990.
(2000) “World Trade Flows, 1980-1997.” Mimeo, University of California, Davis.
and Gordon H. Hanson (1996) “Foreign Investment, Outsourcing, and Relative
Wages,” in Robert C. Feenstra, Gene M. Grossman, and Douglas A. Irwin, eds., The
Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, Cambridge
MA: MIT Press.
and (1999) “The Impact of Outsourcing and High-Technology Capital on Wages:
Estimates for the United States, 1979-1990,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (3),
907–40.
, Robert E. Lipsey, and Harry P. Bowen (1997) “World Trade Flows, 1970-1992,
With Production and Tariﬀ Data.” NBER Working Paper #5910.
Freeman, Richard B. and Remco H. Oostendorp (2001) “The Occupational Wages
around the World Data File,” International Labour Review, 140 (4), 379–401.
Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962) Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Katz, Lawrence and Kevin M. Murphy (1992) “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987:
Supply and Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (1), 35–78.
Keller, Wolfgang (2002) “Geographic Localization of International Technology Diﬀusion,”
American Economic Review, 92 (1), 120–42.
Schott, Peter K. (2003) “One Size Fits All? Heckscher-Ohlin Specialization in Global
Production,” American Economic Review, 93 (3), 686–708.
Schultz, Theodore W. (1960) “Capital Formation by Education,” Journal of Political
Economy, 68 (6), 571–583.
Wilson, Charles A. (1980) “On the General Structure of Ricardian Models with a Con-
tinuum of Goods: Applications to Growth, Tariﬀ Theory, and Technical Change,”
Econometrica, 48 (7), 1675–1702.
Zhu, Susan Chun (2002) “Trade, Product Cycles and Wage Inequality: Theory and
Evidence.” Mimeo, Michigan State University.
and Daniel Treﬂer (2001) “Ginis in General Equilibrium: Trade, Technology and
Southern Inequality.” NBER Working Paper #8446.
33Figure 1. The Growth in Wage Inequality and Shifting Export Shares
Notes: The figure plots changes in a country's wage inequality against a measure of how its export shares have
shifted towards more skill-intensive goods. The panels are partial regression plots. The top panel controls for country
fixed effects. The bottom panel controls for both country fixed effects and changes in the country's relative supply of
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3Table 1. Baseline Estimates
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wage Inequality Equation (14) Dependent Variable: D D D Dln(w Hit/w Lit)
Export Share Shifts DZ it 0.73 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.77 1.00 0.79 0.78
(4.48) (3.83) (3.58) (3.44) (2.04) (2.62) (2.69) (2.35)
Southern Skill Supply Dln(H it/L it) 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34
















Relative Size Dln(L it/L Nt) -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(-0.02) (0.10) (-0.04)
Northern Skill Supply Dln(H Nt/L Nt) -0.09 -0.13 -0.12
(-0.27) (-0.41) (-0.34)
Adjusted R
2 0.64 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.60
F-test for exclusion restrictions
b
0.04 0.52 0.05
















Relative Size Dln(L it/L Nt) 0.02 0.02 0.01
(1.98) (2.28) (1.47)
Northern Skill Supply Dln(H Nt/L Nt) -0.22 -0.33 -0.39
(-0.72) (-1.10) (-1.41)
Southern Skill Supply Dln(H it/L it) 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.04
(0.34) (0.35) (0.90) (0.55)
R
2 0.40 0.41 0.50 0.45
F-test: Dln(L it/L Nt) = Dln(H Nt/L Nt) = 0 1.97 2.71 1.67
Hausman Test (t-statistics)
c 0.12 0.80 0.23 0.16
Overidentification Test (c
2)
c 0.19 1.44 0.19
b) F-test for the joint hypothesis H0: g
m
i,t-j= Dln(L it /L Nt ) = Dln(H Nt /L Nt ) = 0 ( j=1,3,10).  The 5% critical value is 2.89.
Notes: The top panel reports estimates of equation (14). The bottom panel reports estimates of equation (15).  All specifications of equations (14) 
and (15) include country fixed effects. Columns 5-8 report the IV estimates of equation (14) for the case where DZ it is endogenous. The bottom
panel serves as the first-stage regression for these IV estimates. There are 58 observations involving 20 countries and 4 periods (1983-86, 1986-
89, 1990-93, and 1993-97).  t-statistics are in parentheses.
c) A t-statistic in excess of 2.03 indicates rejection of the endogeneity of DZ it at the 5% level. A c
2-statistic in excess of 5.99 indicates rejection
of the instrument set at the 5% level.






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wage Inequality Equation (14) Dependent Variable: D D D Dln(w Hit/w Lit)
Export Share Shifts DZ it 0.73 0.74 0.42 0.54
(4.48) (4.04) (4.07) (2.94)
Southern Skill Supply Dln(H it/L it) 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.40
(3.82) (2.64) (3.69) (4.10) (3.86)
Total Exports:
 Dln(X it) 0.04 -0.00
(1.50) (-0.06)
Lagged Export Share Shifts:
 DZ i,t-j
Adjusted R
2 0.64 0.47 0.63 0.61 0.54
a) This specification includes the log change in the level of country i's manufacturing exports to Northern countries. It
thus examines generic ways in which export growth may affect wage inequality.
b) Newly exported goods are those goods that were not exported at the beginning of the 80s (or 90s), but started to be
exported later in the 80s (or 90s). In column 4, DZ it is constructed using only newly exported goods. Previously
exported goods are those goods that were exported throughout the 80s (or 90s). In column 5, DZ it is constructed using
only previously exported goods.
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the wage inequality equation (14). All specifications include country fixed
effects. There are 58 observations involving 20 countries and 4 periods (1983-86, 1986-89, 1990-93, and 1993-97).  t
statistics are in parentheses.Table A.1. Countries and Key Variables
Countries Year Interval Dln(wHit/wLit) Baseline DZ it Cardinal DZit Dln(H it/L it) g
m
i,t-10
Algeria 1985-89 -0.005 -0.001 -0.000 0.120 -0.048
1990-92 -0.021 -0.000 -0.000 0.102 -0.021
Argentina 1991-93 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.044 0.035
1993-95 -0.047 -0.017 -0.005 0.042 -0.082
Barbados 1985-89 -0.060 -0.040 -0.029 0.054 0.016
1990-93 -0.007 0.015 0.010 0.031 0.033
1993-95 0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.030 0.002
Bolivia 1991-94 -0.002 0.051 0.014 0.029 -0.009
1994-97 -0.037 -0.010 -0.002 0.022 -0.046
Central African Republic 1987-89 0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.214 -0.080
1991-93 -0.061 -0.031 -0.006 -0.001 -0.045
1993-97 -0.067 0.014 0.002 -0.003 0.058
Cyprus 1983-86 0.008 -0.023 -0.007 0.070 -0.005
1986-89 0.026 -0.008 -0.004 0.029 0.000
1990-93 -0.011 0.011 0.004 0.016 0.002
1993-97 0.031 0.016 0.007 0.016 0.020
Honduras 1983-87 0.054 -0.015 -0.004 0.072 -0.106
1990-93 -0.019 -0.019 -0.004 0.020 -0.001
1993-97 0.049 0.049 0.021 0.016 0.010
Hong Kong 1983-85 -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 0.039 0.029
1985-89 0.015 0.004 0.001 0.073 0.032
1991-94 -0.007 0.008 0.003 0.058 0.025
1994-97 0.011 0.012 0.006 0.024 0.022
India 1986-89 0.053 0.005 0.001 0.017 0.022
1990-94 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.030
1994-97 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.022 0.040
South Korea 1983-86 -0.005 -0.009 -0.001 0.088 0.070
1986-89 -0.031 0.006 0.003 0.091 0.057
1991-93 0.011 0.025 0.010 0.072 0.057
1993-97 -0.003 0.024 0.013 0.048 0.070
Sri Lanka 1983-85 -0.023 0.014 0.004 0.010 0.005
1985-88 -0.029 -0.010 -0.004 0.014 0.073
1990-93 -0.006 -0.011 -0.003 0.023 -0.030
1993-97 0.034 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.065
Madagascar 1983-87 -0.073 0.013 0.003 0.062 -0.023
1994-95 -0.093 -0.031 -0.008 0.032 -0.038
Mauritius 1983-85 -0.018 -0.065 -0.019 0.052 -0.282
1985-89 0.053 -0.022 -0.006 0.106 0.015
1990-93 0.003 -0.010 -0.003 0.014 0.039
1993-97 0.006 -0.007 -0.002 0.014 0.045
Mexico 1990-93 0.023 0.018 0.006 0.032 0.028
1993-97 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 0.027 0.048
The Philippines 1983-86 -0.031 -0.001 0.002 0.036 0.091
1986-89 -0.030 -0.004 0.002 0.042 -0.052
1990-94 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.022 0.060
Singapore 1985-89 -0.019 -0.004 0.002 0.027 0.079
1991-93 0.011 0.017 0.013 0.125 0.062
1993-97 -0.008 0.020 0.013 0.069 0.071
Thailand 1984-86 0.071 0.006 0.003 0.082 0.008
1991-95 0.030 0.016 0.006 0.037 0.036
Trinidad and Tobago 1985-88 -0.020 -0.008 -0.003 0.066 -0.051
1990-96 0.019 -0.000 0.000 0.035 -0.027
Uruguay 1985-89 0.021 0.000 -0.000 0.037 -0.018
1990-93 0.035 -0.010 -0.003 0.002 0.044
1993-95 0.038 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002
Venezuela 1984-86 -0.021 -0.011 -0.003 0.003 -0.003
1986-89 -0.052 -0.012 -0.004 -0.027 -0.015
1990-97 0.044 0.039 0.012 0.039 0.021